What impresses you so much about Dorsey?
If I hadn’t just deal with the flu– to the point where I had to delay this for weeks, until after you saw the deals he made to bring Jarvis Landry, Tyrod Taylor and Damarious Randall onto the team— I’m guessing this section would be a harder sell.
I like Dorsey because his personnel judgment, through basically every stage of his career, has been outstanding. H’es shown that he knows how to (a) identify good players, (b) set their fair market value and (c) make appropriate deals.
The strongest criticism you can make of Dorsey is to question the percentage of credit for any specific decision to give him. He’s never been in a situation where he acted entirely alone– where there was no other intelligent and successful person weighing in.
The strongest affirmation you can make is that there are an enormous number of positive indicators, at every step of the way. The simplest way to explain this is to walk through Dorsey’s career.
1. He played in the NFL. Dorsey spent five seasons in Green Bay under Forrest Gregg as a kicking teams coverage demon and occasional starter. The team was falling apart: 8-8 in both of his first two years, then 13-33-1.
Dorsey was active for every game (he four games because there was a strike in 1987 and he wouldn’t cross the picket line) and started 15. He was the sort of player Tank Carder was– not physically talented enough to start, but good enough to hold a roster spot until he had a serious injury and missed a year
That’s always an asset– knowing what players look like because you saw them.
Ray Farmer and Dwight Clark played in the NFL. They were terrible.
Sashi Brown and Butch Davis didn’t play in the NFL– they drafted worse. I guess that means there is no simple “yes-no” question that guarantees success 100% of the time. What a shock.
Pro playing experience isn’t essential, but it is helpful. It gives the person, through memory, an understanding of what it takes to play in the league. At the very least, Dorsey knows how poor the linebackers and kicking teams were– and how much character it takes to play in the NFL.
One of the first steps forward is the departure of largely-failed kicking teams coach Chris Tabor. The stories (both about his re-hiring in Chicago) make him seem like a greater coach than he was.
The Browns made more than their share of errors in the transition game over the years. This year they had a punt blocked, missed an extra point and five of 20 field goals. Both K Zane Gonzalez and KR Jabill Peppers were supposed to be huge upgrades– they weren’t. Peppers ended up losing his job as kick returned to Matthew Dayes. The Browns finished in the bottom five in the NFL in yards allowed per punt return and kickoff returns.
The stories all claim that Tabor wasn’t fired– that he was snatched away by a team that made a hiring coup. The reality is that the Browns let him out of his contract; they replaced him with a better man,
Nobody who has looked at the Arizona Cardinals would say that the Browns had better performance. Amos Jones (kicking teams coach of the Steelers, then with the Cards when Bruce Arians joined) is vastly superior.
Playing in the NFL doesn’t guarantee you can pick talent. But it does give someone real-world perspective with which to push back on scouting reports.
The Browns drafted Cody Kessler based on analytics. There’s a theory that says “Quarterbacks who start 40 games in a major conference and have a completion percentage over 60% turn out of the better QBs than people who don’t.”
The Boys from Harvard thought (like Terry Pluto) that the stat hugely important. It was (I am told) one of the major reasons (1) they weren’t impressed by Carson Wentz and (2) drafted Cody Kessler four rounds sooner than he needed to go.
Dorsey (who drafted Kevin Hogan– who will beat Kessler out– much lower) apparently has said “Kessler’s arm isn’t strong enough.”
Along the same line, a former pro whose played with teammates deemed too short or slow at the combine– who ended up becoming a star because he compensated with other skills– is more likely to push back against the people who want to draft solely on measurables.
To resume, when Dorsey blew out his knee, GM Tom Braatz gave him a chance to scout. That isn’t a point in Dorsey’s favor. Braatz was a terrible GM (he went 20-37 with Atlanta and then 29-49-1 in Green Bay). But when Braatz got fired (after Dorsey’s third season as a scout), the new GM, Ron Wolf, retained him.That is.
Ron Wolf again. He won one title– big deal.
No, he won three. His teams also reached two more Super Bowls, though they did lose (to Vince Lombardi’s Packers and Mike Shanahan’s Broncos). Of the four teams Wolf was employed by in 40 years, he turned all four into playoff teams (and he only spent two seasons with one club and four with a second).
Wolf met Al Davis when they were both in the Army; he came to Oakland as a scout when Davis was hired as the Raiders’ head coach in 1963. Wolf became Oakland’s chief scout and stayed until 1975. During that time, the Raiders went to Super Bowl II, and often had a better regular-season record than Chuck Noll’s Steelers and Don Shula’s Dolphins.
Oakland won the Super Bowl in 1976, but Wolf had left in 1975 to become Tampa Bay’s first GM. The Bucs went 0-14 in 1976 and then 2-12. But they went 5-11 in 1978 before improving to 10-6 and reaching the NFC Championship in year four.
Wolf wasn’t there by 1979– he lost a power struggle with John McKay in 1978– but he drafted the players that playoff team was built upon.
Wolf returned to Oakland between 1978-1989 (when they won two Super Bowls). He then spent 1990-91 with the Jets. He and GM Dick Steinberg (who’d taken the Rams and Patriots to the Super Bowl) inherited a 4-12 team. They went 6-10 in year one. and then 8-8 (which got them a Wild Card berth). That got Wolf hired by Green Bay.
According to Wolf’s quasi-memoir (for some reason, he decided to present it as a business management book), when the Packers hired him, he didn’t like the players they’d been drafting. Step one was to interview every scout and (as it turned out) fire most of them.
Dorsey stayed. In fact, he got promoted twice– first to senior scout, then Director of College Scouting in 1997 (the year the Packers made the Super Bowl and won it).
Dorsey spent two seasons (1997 and 1998) as director of scouting. In both seasons, Green Bay reached thge Super Bowl. They also drafted two Pro Bowl players (safety Darren Sharper and quarterback Matt Hasselbeck) and got a third (guard Mike Wahle) in the supplemental draft.
But Wolf was still in charge
Yes. Also, Mike Holmgren was coach– sharing his hunches with everyone even then. Other successful front office people worked in the Front office too.
The Packers believed a team should never draft a player unless everyone more or less agreed on him.It was one of the things Wolf instilled– an idea drawn from Sid Gillman, Paul Brown and a couple of other legendary minds:
“Don’t take a chance on a player whom most of your staff doesn’t like– unless you’ve spending a very low draft pick.
“If you let one person play a hunch, you’re telling everyone else that their opinion matters less than that person– that hurts morale. Also it means you can waste a pick– and the team suffers– if only one person on the staff is wrong.
“If you have a comparably-rated player than everyone more or less agrees on, take him instead.”
Given that philosophy, we can’t give Dorsey sole credit for the three Pro Bowlers who got drafted. It’s still three guys in two years.
That ratio– one Pro Bowl player per year– will continue for the next 20 years.
At the end of the 1998 season, (Dorsey’s second season as Scouting Director), Holmgren’s contract expired. The Walrus believed (wrongly) that he could handle being both coach and GM.
When Seattle gave him a big contract to do it, he left, taking two members of Wolf’s front office with him. Ted Thompson became Holmgren’s GM for administrative functions (meaning he did the GM job while Holmgren was coaching) and Dorsey became Director of Player Personnel.
How’d that work out?
Badly. The Seahawks reached the playoffs– but had a horrible draft in 1999. They made seven picks but got only three starters (the best only started two seasons). At the end of the 1999 season, Dorsey returned to Green Bay as scouting director.
I have heard three different stories about what happened:
- Dorsey says he missed Green Bay (he’d left his family there) so he asked Wolf to take him back– and Holmgren to let him return.
- A Seattle friend says Holmgren made almost every pick in 1999 based on one of his “hunches”. Except for a few rounds, the top players on Dorsey’s board didn’t get taken. Having his views overridden really upset Dorsey– plus they picked badly.
- Green Bay slipped to 8-8 without Holmgren and missed the playoffs. Wolf took an enormous amount of heat from the fans (remember, in Green Bay, fans own the team) for letting the coach get away. He fired Ray Rhodes after one year and brought back Dorsey.
Which story do you believe?
All of the above:
- There were numerous reports about Holmgren overruling his staff. Like Butch Davis did in Cleveland, he’d get a glint in his eye and the discussion was over. In Holmgren’s four years as GM, Seattle made 38 picks– only two of whom (RB Shaun Alexander and G Steve Hutchinson) were any good.
- Wolf was under pressure. He retired (at 62) only two years after the 8-8 season. When Green Bay hired Mike Sherman in 2000, they promised him that he’d serve as Coach and GM after a year of working under Wolf.
- Dorsey stayed with Green Bay for 12 more years. He rarely interviewed for openings; a source who’d know if he was looking to move up says “Compared to some guys, Dorsey didn’t seem to want to leave.”
Dorsey spent the years 2000 to 2011 as Director of College Scouting. During those 12 years, the Packers drafted 15 Pro Bowl players:
Counting the three guys in two seasons as college scout with the 1990s Packers (and the year in Seattle) that’s 15 seasons as the senior draft guy and 18 Pro Bowl players selected.
Because Dorsey wasn’t the #1 man in the hierarchy (the GM was) or even the #2 man (the coach was), I can’t give him 100% credit for any of those picks.
But in 2012, Green Bay promoted Dorsey to Director of Football Operations (in an attempt to keep teams from hiring him), which made him the #2 guy in the ranking. He could, if he wanted to, overrule McCarthy– only Thompson could stop him. Also, all five of his drafts (2013-17) with Kansas City were under his control.
In those six years, we see the same rate of return– six years, seven Pro Bowl players:
The seven Pro Bowl players in six seasons, added to the 18 in 15 years, means Dorsey has (to underplay this as much as I can) worked for teams that drafted 24 Pro Bowl players in 21 years.
The striking thing about that draft history is how well balanced it is. Let me break down the players by position:
- QB: 2.
- RB: 1.
- OL: 5 (three tackles, two guards)
- REC: 7 (five wideouts; two tight ends)
- DL: 4 (two ends, two tackles)
- LB: 2, (If you think Gbaja-Bijamila was was more of a 3-4 linebacker than a 4-3 end, you could add him here and reduce the linemen to three)
- DB: 3. (two corners; one safety)
- KT: 2. (a kick returner, and kick coverage)
That’s every position on the field. And since the Packers switched from a 4-3 to 3-4 on defense, it is everything except a 3-4 defensive end.
That broad distribution is an enormously good sign, One of the problems with hiring a vaunted scout as your GM is that virtually no one scouts every position equally well.
Usually people are best at scouting the positions they played or coached, with the next level of skill being the positions they played or coached against. That is, a former center will be best at scouting offensive lineman– with defensive linemen being next.
Some scouts have prejudices about certain schools (or conferences) races or body types. Some guys still believe in the “Award winners are all overrated” theory; others don’t trust stats (or rely on them too much).
A guy with a known blind spot about certain things can be overruled by the GM when he is one of the voices in a room. If he becomes the voice, he often indulges himself.
Phil Savage would be an excellent example. Savage had a reputation as a brilliant judge of talent– but only about offensive linemen or the front seven on defense.
His opinions about offensive skill positions were flawed (Baltimore had enormous problems finding quarterbacks and receivers), and he was very biased about programs. He loved the Miami Hurricanes and overvalued Big 12, SEC and Big Ten prospects.
Savage admitted that he didn’t think PAC-10 players play well in the cold; for some reason he doesn’t have that same skepticism of SEC players. People have told me that he feels PAC-10 teams play finesses ball– that they weren’t physical.
I don’t know if any of that is true– but that’s how Savage behaved in Cleveland.
In his first draft (2005) Aaron Rodgers literally fell into his lap. A lot of people thought Rodgers would be the first pick, but San Francisco felt Utah’s Alex Smith (who hadn’t played as much and hadn’t got as much high-end coaching) had a higher ceiling and took him.
With the second pick, Nick Saban (coaching the Dolphins) took RB Ronnie Brown (feeling, I guess, that Gus Frerotte and Sage Rosenfels were good enough).
2005, by the way, was the draft that scared teams off taking running backs with high picks. Brown, Cedric Benson (taken fourth) and Cadillac Williams (fifth) all bombed, and everyone decided backs were too unreliable to be trusted. They kept taking all the other positions they had been taking, but this is the reason some people don’t want to pick Saquon Barkley high.
Unfortunately, Rodgers played at Cal-Berkeley. Savage took Michigan WR Braylon Edwards (who had some good years, but was basically a bust), took FS Brodney Pool and WR Antonio Perkins of Oklahoma– and chose QB Charlie Frye in round three. The following year, he took LB Kam Wimbley (Florida State) WR Travis Wilson (Oklahoma again) and LB Leon Williams of Miami– all fo whom busted
That– plus a disastrous trade for Brady Quinn in 2007– is what got Savage fired.
Green Bay ended up with Rodgers due to an impressive bit of discipline. Green Bay wanted a replacement for Brett Favre, but they only had pick 24. After working out their mock drafts, they simply waited for Rodgers to fall to them.
They didn’t pull a Tom Heckert-style panic move and give away draft picks in order to move up. They waited and waited– and the minute they were on the clock, they grabbed him.
Someone on in the draft room (perhaps Coach-GM Mike Sherman, more likely one of the assistant GMs– or maybe Dorsey) had correctly assessed the draft needs of the teams with the 20 picks between the Browns and Green Bay and concluded that none of these teams were likely to pick Rodgers.
To be fair to the teams who passed on Rodgers in that draft, 8 of the 20 players taken instead of him went to the Pro Bowl. Also Many of the teams who passed on Rodgers had a reason. Minnesota, for example, took WR Troy Williamson (a complete bust). But if they had taken Rodgers, everyone would have said “Why do you need him when QB Daunte Culpepper just gone to the Pro Bowl?”
I am, as some of you might guess, not rambling. I mention this because it very likely could happen again. Green Bay and Kansas City have been very successful by “reading the room” and not reaching for players they like. We might see something like this again. on draft day.
Since Dorsey was at at least partially responsible for Rodgers and Matt Hasselbeck, I’d guess he can be trusted to identify a quarterback.
You don’t think Dorsey made those picks?
I think he was one of many people in the room who agreed on those choices:
- Wolf served as GM until the 2001 draft was completed.
- After Wolf retired, Coach Mike Sherman served as Coach and GM from 2002-04; Green Bay went 32-16, making the playoffs all three years.
- When Seattle removed Holmgren as GM in 2005, Thompson immediately returned to Green Bay as GM. He served a GM in 2005 (when they went 4-12), then hired Mike McCarthy as coach in 2006. That tander went 121-70, with a Super Bowl win and playoffs in 9 of 12 seasons.
As the infomercials say, “But wait– there’s more.” The front office also included John Schneider (the GM who got Pete Carroll into two Super Bowls) and Reggie McKenzie (who inherited the mess Hue Jackson left in Oakland and got them to the playoffs).
That said, Dorsey was in charge of scouting; nobody suggested he was doing a bad job. I’ve occasionally heard stories about a player who got taken because someone sold the rest of the room (Green Bay took Donald Driver in round 7 because Alonzo Highsmith loved him), but everyone credited Dorsey as the guy driving the train.
Anyway, the Packers drafted 18 Pro Bowl player in 14 years (getting at least one in 10 of the 14 years) despite drafting consistently low. It seems unlikely that the head of College Scouting was the weak link. Since he went to the Chiefs– and they got a Pro Bowler per year– the odds get lower.
To return to the chronology, in 2012, Green Bay gave Thompson a loftier title and ‘promoted’ Dorsey to Director of Football Operations. That was done so Green Bay could claim that Dorsey was the GM (in charge of all football operations) and moving to another team as a GM would be a forbidden lateral move.
The argument didn’t hold up. When the Chiefs went after Dorsey, they said “In 2011 Dorsey was second in authority to Thompson– the same thing was true in 2012. It doesn’t matter if his title changed from High Mogul to Grand Panjandrum– his place in the hierarchy (second to Thompson) is the issue.”
The league office needed to rule on it, but Kansas City was able to hire Dorsey away to be their GM in 2013.
Then he hired Andy Reid and rebuilt the Chiefs?
Not exactly Because the Browns hired one of the people who screwed the Chiefs up as their offensive coordinator, I’ll go into what happened in detail in another piece. But here are the bullet points for Dorsey’s tenure in Kansas City:
- Dorsey inherited a team that had gone 23-41 under GM Scott Pioli and head coaches Todd Haley and Romeo Crennel (yes, they di-id).
- The team went 2-14 the year before Dorsey was hired.
- The Chiefs improved to 11-5 in year one and went 43-21 in four years.
- Dorsey was fired– but not for cause.
The reality is more complex, but the first three are factual (albeit misleading)– and I’m pretty sure about the fourth.
Why is it complex?
1. Dorsey didn’t hire Andy Reid; Reid didn’t report to him. Both Dorsey and Reid reported to Owner Clark Hunt. While both were interviewed at the same time, Dorsey was hired a week after Reid was.
It wasn’t a shotghun marriage. Because Pioli and Haley had spent three seasons at each other’s throats, Hunt wanted to make sure the coach and GM could work together. One reason he hired Dorsey and Reid is that both guys worked for the Packers (Reid was on Holmgren’s staff for eight years) and knew each other well.
2. The two men shared power. On paper, Dorsey had full control of the roster. But when a rookie GM is working with a veteran coach– who has been highly successful– it’s never that cut and dry.
It’s not correct to say (as some people do) that the moves were always approved by Reid, but Dorsey didn’t have full control. If they butted heads, the owner made the call– and Hunt made it very clear that he didn’t want them constantly butting heads. But it wasn’t the traditional “Coach reports to GM” arrangement.
3. The team Dorsey and Reid inherited wasn’t nearly as bad as their record. The went 2-14 in 2012, but it had won 17 games in the two previous years and had a bunch of players who’d gone to the Pro Bowl. What happened wasn’t a rebuild– it was more like an episode of “pimp my skill positions“.
Do you know why Dorsey got fired?
Oh, that’s easy. Dorsey got fired for the same reason GM Tom Modrak got fired by the Eagles after 2001. In both cases:
- The head coach and the GM were hired at the same time and given contracts of equal length.
- When the team became successful, Reid said he wanted more control over personnel and indicated that the team needed to commit to either him or the GM
- The owner decided it would be harder to find a new coach and dumped the GM.
Andy Reid was Mike Holmgren’s protege. Like Holmgren, he’s always positive that the team will do better if he makes every decision. Reid is very skilled at convincing owners that he is responsible for everything good, while the GM did everything that went wrong.
Unfortunately, the post-mortem of Modrak’s departure isn’t online anymore, but the “Why was Dorsey fired?” contains almost exactly the same quotes:
“His management style and communication within the franchise came under scrutiny, according to a Kansas City Star report.
“John does stuff and doesn’t tell people why,” a source told the newspaper.
That’s exactly what was said when the Eagles let Modrak go– and it wasn’t true then, either.
How do you know what happened?
Because I know a lot of people in Philly and I understand how the Holmgren coaching tree works. Let me give you a sample conversation that illustrates the “communication problem” that occurs when Read is your coach:
Reid: “Why are we even considering this idea? We need to get this player and that one instead.”
GM: [Outlines the problem, the merits of each option and explains why he disagrees.]
Reid: “You’re wrong. My way is much better.”
GM: [Explains, at length and in detail, the problem with Reid’s approach and why he prefers his alternative.]
Reid: “Your way won’t work. If we do it my way, we win the Super Bowl next year.”
As a friend from Philly put it “You can’t reach a consensus with a brick wall.” At some point, the GM realizes he has two options:
- “Give up and do it Reid’s way.” (Your reward for knuckling under will be Reid telling the beat writers he likes how the front office turned a simple decision into a long, drawn-out process).
- “Act over his objections” (and have the papers report that Reid wasn’t consulted, and never had a chance to make his case).
Over time, Reid gets frustrated, Eventually he says “It’s silly to keep fighting all the time. We need people on the same page. If you want to keep the GM, I’ll leave when my contract expires.”
When Jeff Lurie fired Modrak (after the Eagles had gone 11-5 and made the playoffs), it happened in May. Hunt whacked Dorsey in June.
You’re being pretty hard on Reid
I wasn’t that hard on him in 2001– I wrote that the Eagles decision was unfortunate, and wearing two hats wasn’t working for Reid’s mentor in Seattle. But I also said Reid had done a great job turning the Eagles around– that he might well deserve more control. Over the past 17 seasons, my support for “Let’s give Andy Reid more input” has plummeted.
2001-05: Reid as Coach and GM. The Eagles got away with this for a while. They went 54-26, losing the conference championship three consecutive seasons– then reaching the Super Bowl, but losing. But the team didn’t seem to be improving (they were adding a lot of veterans)– and it crashed to 6-10 in 2005.
2006-09: Reid as coach, Tom Heckert as ‘GM.’ The quotes indicate that Heckert (and Joe Banner) did a lot of the work, but Reid had final say on the roster. Players couldn’t be brought into or sent out of the organization without Reid’s OK. That worked less well. Philly reached the playoffs there times and lost the conference championship loss in 2008,but their record declined to 38-25-1.
Heckert left to join the Browns– who gave him control of the roster. Neither Lurie (who perceived the slippage) nor Reid (who still felt constrained) tried hard to keep him.
2010-12: Read as coach, Howie Roseman as ‘GM’. Reid still had control, but his hold on power was slipping. The Eagles went 10-6 (losing the wild card) in year one, fell to 8-8– and when they went to 4-12, Reid was done.
Since the Eagles just won the Super Bowl with Roseman in charge, that’s another sign that Andy Reid shouldn’t be running the show. Since history seems to be repeating in Kansas City (albeit much faster), that’s still more evidence.
The Chiefs went 43-21 with Dorsey as GM, making the playoffs three times. Without him, they fell to 10-6, squeaked into the playoffs and lost to a weak opponent.
With Alex Smith and Marcus Peters gone, the chances of the Chiefs staying over .500 seem remote. Reid threw a bunch of coaches overboard (he’ll call plays next year) and Kansas City is trying to beef up the front office. Reid will be 60 next year, and if Mahomes doesn’t play well next year, I’d guess he is done.
I don’t see anything there to scare me off Dorsey.
Dorsey hasn’t communicated well here
He hasn’t said what the fans and media want to be told. They keep having hissy-fits because he won’t blow smoke up their butts. That’s not the same as communicating poorly.
How do you know Dorsey isn’t the problem?
Let me give you two reasons.
1. Here’s s a lengthy profile of Dorsey. It was written by the team media department, so it goes a little over the top. But assuming that they didn’t make everything up, Dorsey doesn’t come off as the kind of obnoxious jerk the firing analysis made him out to be.
Sometimes these essays disappear when a person leaves. If you can’t fine it, try the archived link here.
2. I’m positive I know who the source of “What we’ve got is failure to commun’cate” story. I don’t trust the SOB.
When a reporter does an analysis, they almost always mention the sources for the story at some point in the piece. It’s a psychological tic– they speak in very general terms, but then mention a couple of names. That makes it very easy to figure out who spoke. Here’s another line from the story:
“For instance, the typically stable Chiefs also made waves this offseason when Dorsey released director of football administration Trip MacCracken and director of pro scouting Will Lewis. “
That made it very clear. Dorsey fired two people– the story quotes two people who (based on the identifiers in the piece) were not working for the Chiefs. Those are most likely the sources.
More to the point, the anonymous Dorsey-basher sound exactly like Trip MacCracken, who used to work for the Browns. McCracken, like Sashi Brown, is another one of these egocentric lawyers who imagines that passing the bar automatically conveys greater knowledge about personnel than some dimwitted ex-jock.
When he was in Cleveland, MacCracken spent a good amount of time complaining about the idiotic decision Savage made in 2007, when he passed up a “no doubt about it” Hall of Fame running back (meaning Adrian Peterson) to take “a blocker” (Joe Thomas).
You can argue that a running back helps more than a tackle. But Thomas has been better at his job than Peterson has. Peterson is about to get cut again– probably ending his career– while every team would take Thomas if he came back.
I researched Dorsey’s firings and learned that they stemmed from arguments (toward the end of Dorsey’s tenure) about excessive contracts given to veterans. Specific issues were:
- The point in the player’s contract when negotiation for an extension began (earlier than needed)
- The amount of the contract (longer and more highly-aid than necessary)
- The way the contract was structured. Not just the amount of guaranteed money; but whether the salary was consistent from year to year or structured to be very low for a year or two– then really high.
It looked to me as if the contracts were team-unfriendly– as if the person didn’t care about cap issues. In those cases, it’s because the coach (who wants to win now) wanted the player signed and the matter settled.
I’m told that both guys were aligning with Reid over Dorsey. Lewis (who would produce the estimates of where the player ranked in relation to his peers) would report that the player was substantially better that other sources believed he was. Rather than make smaller offers– and risk extending the process– MacCracken made the deals generous.
Dorsey decided they were working against him, so he let them go. Reid didn’t appreciate losing allies; it strengthened his resolve to shoulder Dorsey aside.
That’s just your opinion.
Well, all of this stuff is just my opinion. I know that nobody else has hired MacCracken and Lewis to comparable positions.
I’m not worried about Dorsey’s communication skills. I’m more interested in how well he drafts. The evidence suggests he is very good at that.